

Christopher Lloyd

## Past, Present, and Future in the Global Expansion of Capitalism:

Learning From The Deep and Surface Times of Societal Evolution  
and the Conjunctions of History

### Historia Magistra Vitae: Some Themes for Discussion

What of the present does anyone know who only the present knows? And what of the future can anyone know who does, indeed, know the past? Even as we come to understand that the present conjunctions, events, and processes we know and inhabit are but the moments of a deep, long-lived turbulent river of historical time that has brought us here, shaped all that we observe and experience and will carry us into the future, it affords us little knowledge of that future. The future (especially societal future) can exist in imagination but not within knowledge and so cannot be predicted with any absolute certainty. Nevertheless, as modern beings, we fervently hope to create it and control it and the desire to do so has grown, contradictorily, with the revolution of modernity. Modernity in the affirmative sense is above all the embodiment of the desire for freedom from control by traditions and by others<sup>1</sup>; at its most radical, it is the desire to be individually un-determined, to be in constant motion, to be escaping constantly from objectivity into absolute individual subjectivity. To be ultramodern<sup>2</sup> is to be *avant garde*, remaining continually at the horizon of creation of the future, an open-ended future without objective determination, free from the restraints of the past. To the ultramodernist, the traditional is to be left behind, abandoned, preferably forgotten, while the future is available for conscious creation, without limitation. This hubris is as delusionary as the teleological master narratives that it rejects.

That we are part of and living within the flow of historical time seems to be understood implicitly everywhere, even by ultramodernists, as a fundamental aspect of all human cultures. The ever-present existence of the past within material construc-

tions, memories, legends, traditions, representations, has been integral to human existence for at least 30,000 years and perhaps much longer, and is one of the crucial features of humanity as a species. Reflections upon and representations of history as an exosomatic form of human consciousness and sociality has become increasingly important as societies, cultures, and knowledge have evolved. Consciousness of and representations of the apparent continuities of past and present and of future possibilities are fundamental to making us human.

In all historical, evolving systems, history is determined above all by history itself. Novelty, the substance of historicity, can only emerge from the existing inherited situation. Social history is an emergent property and unintended consequence of social organisation and social reproduction through time. The inheritance of the past is what makes possible, and sets the limits, of the present and the future. There is always by necessity a path dependency in each natural domain, including the domain of human sociality. But this does not mean that we go confidently into the future knowing which way ahead the path must lie for historical enquiry reveals the unpredicted cataclysmic and catastrophic ruptures and discontinuities that litter the way at uneven intervals as well as the continuities and dependencies that also guide us. To really know about the present is to know about the past and so those who would wish to understand, control, and ameliorate the present and project their desires upon the future have to learn how we came to be here. The study of the present and the future cannot be divorced somehow from the study of the past. Any lingering belief in a distinction between history and social science should be abandoned.<sup>3</sup>

The desire for a knowledge that penetrates beneath and then permits control of and transcendence of legends and traditions arose within those agrarian civilisations whose leaders wanted to transcend their own spatial, temporal, and even earthly limitations. A linear, teleological, and transcendent, rather than cyclical or apocalyptic, understanding of social time came to the fore within late Classical civilisations, further developed within Judaeo-Christian and Islamic civilisations, and reached its apogee within modernity<sup>4</sup>. But late modernity (or ultramodernity) has also afforded, dialectically and ironically, the transcendence, in turn, of linear progressiveness and the possibility of its displacement by the non-linear, systemic concepts of evolution, chaos, and complexity. The discontinuities as much as the continuities, the transitions, the ruptures, the contingencies, the path dependencies, the cycles, are all parts of this new understanding of the deep but very turbulent flow of time that we inhabit fleetingly in the present and which flows onwards on its largely unpredictable path.

Historical understanding and knowledge today, from the standpoints of the complexity and contingency of a post-imperial world, which is at last emerging after thousands of years, and the advances of scientific explanation that have come from the new evolutionary and systems theorising, teaches us important things, among

which is that linear projections are very likely to deceive us about the future. We have discovered that societal history, like geological and biological history, has not been a unidirectional process and there is no reason to believe it will be in the future. Nevertheless, the possibilities are not undetermined and causation is everywhere. The evolved and evolving structure of the social world can be investigated and we can come to know, ironically, the nature of contingency and the limitations of its possibilities.

Given this context and in order to explore the issue of *historia magistra vitae*, this paper tries to unite two interconnected themes.

- (i) The theme of *la longue durée* structural history of the world (to use Braudel's term), concentrating on what I see as the central process of the past 500 years – the violent expansion of capitalism as an economic, cultural, and geopolitical system and especially the six kinds of wars that have convulsed, and continue to convulse, the world during the system's rise to global dominance, universality and eventual probable transcendence.
- (ii) The theme of how the concepts of time, evolution, and structurism are able to provide the framework for analysis of long-run societal history and futurology. Understandings of past, present and future must be united by a social science that is able to reveal the deep as well as surface time of human social structuring and the forms of structured sociality.

### Global Wars of Capitalist Expansion: Catastrophes and Continuities in The Long-Run of Global Geopolitics and Economics

In 1519 the Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortez landed his little army of European freebooters and mercenaries on the mainland of the Americas. They were seeking to loot precious resources, especially gold, which could be converted into landed resources at home, to seize land in the Americas, and to enslave local populations to work that land for the benefit of the quasi-feudal conquistador class that was emerging from the conquest of the Caribbean islands. Land and slave labour were the keys to what happened subsequently. Confronting Cortez on the coast was a patchwork of small belligerent states owing various degrees of allegiance or hostility to the imperial Aztec state hundreds of kilometres inland in the central valley of Mexico. Through violence, negotiations, and guile Cortez constructed an allied army from the coastal peoples with which to confront the Aztec army of a hundred thousand warriors. Marching inland he eventually reached the wondrous lake city of Tenochtitlan. Splendid religious towers and palaces rose from the islands of Lake

Texcoco higher than any European cathedral in a city larger than any in Europe. But within two years through violence, tactics, deception, and disease, the Spaniards and their allies destroyed the great Aztec empire as a polity, a society, and a civilization. Soon the city was razed from the earth, the lake drained, and, thanks in part to Old World diseases, the splendours of central American civilization passed into history to be replaced by a new kind of mestizo civilization of Euro-American ethnic and cultural lineage. Isolated for so long from the mainstream of humanity, the peoples and cultures of the Americas could not resist the military technology and organisation, including gunpowder and wheeled vehicles, nor, above all, the biology of the Old World in the forms of micro-organisms, horses, and hunting dogs. Here was the catastrophic event that, with hindsight, we can see as marking the dawn of global history. Events like it were to become common throughout the world in subsequent centuries.

Deep beneath the surface of such catastrophes and of everyday events of the social world, as with the events of the biological, geological, and cosmological realms, there are powerful, slow moving forces through time of which we are but dimly if at all aware. These forces sometimes starkly reveal themselves in mushrooming eruptions of cataclysmic events, such as the conquest of Mexico, the making sense of which is the fundamental task of scientific enquiry in all these domains. Enquiry into the deep time of society is no different in its basic tasks or even its basic methodology from that of geological, biological, or astronomical science. All are historical rather than experimental sciences, concerned to observe and explain the real, long-run processes at work. I shall return more explicitly to this issue in a later section of this paper but it is the basic theme that unites what I shall say. We can only make sense, I believe, of dramatic events like the conquest of Mexico or the European conquest and settlement of Australia or, in our time, the most recent of many conquests and re-buildings of Baghdad or the seemingly inexorable movement towards global free trade, within a larger and deeper framework of world history.

Looking back at the past 500 years many people, especially ruling elites and their ideologues as well as many of their anti-imperialist opponents, have been apt to read and interpret the expansion of capitalism and the construction of European empires as inevitable, leading necessarily to our present situation of the global triumph of western capitalism. But this is certainly not what really happened. By examining the violent history of the wars of capitalism we can begin to grasp the contingencies of capitalist expansion and ask about why capitalism survived and prospered and came to dominance. This is a somewhat different question than that of the classical theorists of European imperialism, who tended to concentrate on the more recent history and see imperialism as mainly a necessary economic function of industrial capitalism from the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century. In fact, organised, large-scale violence by Eu-

ropean states was crucial throughout the five centuries; and at various vital moments the outcomes of conflicts shaped the history in unpredictable ways. Other outcomes of wars were often possible. Right at the beginning, for example, it was possible for the Aztecs to have defeated and vanquished Cortez's army. But would the Spaniards have gone away, never to return? That was very unlikely for, if for no other reason, the European diseases, unleashed upon the peoples of the Americas, would not have retreated. In their wake, the Europeans would have returned, as happened in North America after the first Spanish incursions.

World or global history began to emerge, then, in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries as contacts grew between the four great hemispheres of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Hitherto there had been negligible interconnections. The great imperial civilizations of Afro-Europe and Asia in the 2000 years before 1400 CE had sometimes glimpsed each other across the vast oceans of water and sand and enormous mountain barriers separating the Mediterranean region and Asia but found the distance and terrain too great. Even those all-conquering central Asiatic cavalries of the Huns, the Mongols, the Tartars, and the Uzbeks did not weld together sustainable Eurasian empires. Europeans and Asians always retreated from each other in earlier times as so well exemplified by Alexander the Great, who turned back from the gate of South Asia, exhausted, temporarily he thought. (How different would world history have been had he survived, restored his forces, and resumed his eastward march?) American civilizations rose and fell in isolation from the others. But by the 15<sup>th</sup> century CE, when a Eurasian-wide consciousness and trading system were finally emerging, thanks in part to the ever-adventurous Venetians, European adventurism began to eclipse the reticent adventurism of China, India, and Persia.

The beginnings of the European outward thrust was on the basis of a fundamentally new force in world history, an organisational and cultural force that over time has profoundly transformed the world, the lives of all humanity, and the very biosphere in which we all live. That force is capitalism or, more precisely, the *legitimised and institutionalised* individualist impulse to accumulate economic power and wealth *privately*, as an end in itself, through the investment of capital in order to breed more capital. The emergence and protection of private property rights in land and other fixed assets was central. The systematic accumulation of wealth, out of trade, exploitation, theft, plunder, and violence is a phenomenon much older than capitalism. The conversion of wealth into capital through private investment, the further accumulation out of trade and later out of industry through the greater exploitation of wage labour, and, moreover, *the institutionalisation of an economic, social, and political regime that supported capitalism*, was new in the world in small areas in northern Italy and the Low Countries in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. It was not private investment that was new for there had always been small-scale investment in trade and handicraft

manufacturing in many parts of the world but the large-scale institutionalisation of a whole capitalist investment, production, and political regime based on private property rights and the thrust to geographical and social expansion that came with it was new.

Such a large-scale development had not been possible to any significant extent within the imperial/bureaucratic structures of ancient or medieval Asia, the Middle East or Europe.<sup>5</sup> Great private wealth certainly existed in all the states of the ancient and medieval worlds but the means of its acquisition, what could be done with it, and the institutional structure of its accumulation, agglomeration (to use Marx's term), and investment, were all then non-capitalist or state and consumption oriented or at least subject to bureaucratic control over property rights. Imperial state power (usually intertwined with religious power) dominated wealth in all times and places hitherto.<sup>6</sup> The breaking free by capitalists and private property from states from the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe and their later control of states for imperialistic purposes was a great turning point in world history.

A crucial role was played in the development of capitalism by the peculiar conjuncture in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century of Habsburg Imperial Spain, Protestant revolutionaries in The Netherlands, Resurgent Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam. This conjuncture reminds us of another, eerily similar conjuncture today between Imperial America, Resurgent Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam. This time it is Iraqis who are rebellious against the empire rather than the protestant Dutch, and the Jewish people (via the Jewish state) are in the ascendancy rather than being either expelled from the Empire or helping to lay the foundations for Dutch economic strength through their migration from Habsburg Catholic Southern Netherlands to independent Protestant Holland.<sup>7</sup>

That earlier conjuncture was sparked in 1492 when, in that same year, the Christian reconquista finally succeeded in vanquishing the Moslem states of Iberia, Columbus reached the Americas, and the expulsion of the Jews and Moslems from the Habsburg Empire began. Catholic revanchism was essential to the conquest of Mexico for already Habsburg rule and influence was coming into question in Europe through the Protestant Reformation. New converts were needed. The Catholic Church was strongly supportive of the Spanish and Portuguese campaigns of conquest and forcible conversion and of the later savage wars against Protestants in Europe.

It was not Catholic Spain, however, that reaped the long-term benefits of New World conquests after 1492. It lacked the capitalistic institutions and culture. Rather, the wealth flowed into and through the financial intermediaries of Europe based in Northern Italy and the Low Countries. The financiers and merchants of Milan, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and other Dutch cities corralled the wealth and invested it to their advantage. Capitalism required large amounts of capital and

it came in part from non-capitalist sources to begin with (Marx's original accumulation of capital, a process essentially of plunder, which has been repeated in recent times within the former Soviet Union), which augmented existing surpluses from production and trade. The Capitalistic Protestants of the Atlantic maritime powers of Northern Europe – the Dutch, the Huguenots, the Danes, and above all, as time went on, the English, were the beneficiaries of the New World plunder, constructing both their own financial intermediaries as the means to establishing commercially-based empires in the Americas and Asia and profitably investing the great increase in European wealth.

### Wars of Capitalist Conquest as the First of Six Kinds of Capitalist Warfare

Having seen off the Moslem Turkish threat at Vienna and Lepanto in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century and begun to exploit the vast wealth of metals, land, and labour of the Americas, the first great form of global warfare of Euro-Atlantic capitalist expansion had begun. This was an imperialistic campaign of conquest of cultures, environments, and, above all, of resources – land for large-scale commercial agriculture, minerals and later lubricants and fuels, and labour in the form of slavery on a vast new scale<sup>8</sup>. The rudimentary beginnings of a world market for finance, goods, and labour appeared as did the beginnings of a merger of the biotas of the Old World and the New Worlds. Not since the heyday of the expansion of the late Roman Republic and the early Roman imperium in the last century BCE was there such a combination of impulses for conquest. The vast medieval conquests of Arabs, Mongols, Uzbeks, and Mughals, had lacked one or more of these impulses. And this time, from the 16<sup>th</sup> Century, the vital new ingredient was the privatisation of empire. Cortez, Pizarro, Aguirre, and all the other Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch conquerors acted largely on their own initiatives and in their own interests or of their corporate or noble backers. Their notional imperial commanders could not easily control these unruly agents, given especially the distances and communication difficulties.

The global war of conquest of resources by the expansionist Euro-Atlantic capitalists gathered pace through the 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and has not concluded even yet as we see with the oil wars of the Middle East in our time. The resistance in the Americas, Africa, and Oceania varied and in many places was relatively limited and in those places the conquest was complete and new forms of hybrid settler or mestizo societies emerged. This kind of global war of conquest was and is but the first of six kinds of warfare of capitalist expansion and resistance to it. These six kinds of warfare are peculiar to the era of capitalist expansion and endogenous to the history of capitalism in all its forms. But not all forms of warfare are peculiar to capitalism.

Indeed, warfare may well be endogenous to all societies. Whether it will remain so is an open question<sup>9</sup>. Organised violence probably arose as a consequence of territoriality and ethnobonding by small, genetically-interconnected, human groups, which is as old as humanity in all its subspecies, if Chimpanzee society is any guide<sup>10</sup>. Societal formation on a larger scale and consciousness of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic boundaries, produced »natural warfare« over resources and cultural exclusiveness. The basis of such warfare persists and takes the forms of interethnic conflict, tribal blood feuds, and local territorial disputation. Another form of »original« warfare arose in ancient agricultural societies as a consequence of emergence and growth in inequality of social classes. Class warfare within and between classes has been more or less endemic in all societies since the rise of large-scale agricultural states. And those states also produced a third kind of »original« warfare – imperial conquest of agricultural territory. Once large states emerged out of local conflicts imperial expansion became the fundamental aspect of state policy for the conquest of new labour power and the land on which it worked was imperative for ruling elites so as to maximise the vast wealth and political and sexual power that imperial conquests supplied. The male socio-biological imperative to warfare seems clear.<sup>11</sup>

The global wars of capitalism differ in some fundamental respects from all these »original« types of warfare but not in others. Expansionary capitalism by its nature has engendered its own violent geopolitics. Indeed, the wars of capitalism have concatenated such that as each successive form of conflict has emerged it has added to rather than supplanted the earlier imperatives to warfare so that by the early 21<sup>st</sup> century all six kinds of warfare are present within the global system to some extent. Far from there being a *Pax Americana*, violence or its incipient threat has never been so widespread since the end of bipolarity and the emergence of American unilateralism.

### Inter-Imperial Wars of Hegemony

Having conquered most of the Americas and small parts of Asia and Africa by the mid 18<sup>th</sup> Century, a second kind of conflict within global capitalist expansionism broke out – the world wars between Euro-Atlantic imperial powers for global hegemony. The power of capitalists was now so great that they could use the imperial states to engage in a great arms race to defend the national interconnections between culture, capital, economy, state, and the imperial possessions. So crucial were those possessions that the state/capital/wealth symbiosis would be gravely weakened without them. Colonial wealth underpinned the metropolises and their ruling classes, as the surviving grandiose imperial streetscapes of London, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Amsterdam testify today.

The leading capitalist imperial powers – Britain and France – having in the 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries neutered the Spanish, Austrian, and Dutch ambitions, now plunged into the first global inter-imperial struggle from the 1750s. By 1759, the most important year in this geopolitical story since 1521, Britain and its allies defeated France in Europe, North America, and, most importantly, in India. This victory could be attributable to the more advanced state of British capitalism and its interconnection with a modern state after the bourgeois revolutions of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century which aligned the state and capitalist interests before elsewhere in Europe.<sup>12</sup> Thus began a new stage of capitalist expansion in which the leading powers not only fought each other across the whole globe but began the conquest of other great Eurasian empires. This global form of war – the war for hegemony between superpowers – as with global conquests of resources, has continued through many phases ever since, including the Napoleonic Wars, two phases of German attempts to rise to superpower dominance, a phase of Japanese ambition, and the Russo/American confrontation. The great losers were the old Asian empires of China, India, Persia, and Turkey.

We may be fairly certain that both these forms of capitalist warfare – for resources and hegemony – have now almost finally run their courses. Superpowers no longer have the capacity to dominate the world because the economic development, the global economic integration, the educated public opinion that capitalism has eventually brought to much of the world, and the proliferation of nation states, many with WMDs, make such wars unprofitable and unwinnable abroad and unpopular at home. While this conclusion is taking some time to be grasped in Washington and Moscow, unfortunately, the failures of George Bush's America and Vladimir Putin's Russia show it clearly. The Age of Empires and imperial rivalries that lasted thousands of years is ending in the bloodied streets of Baghdad and Grozny. While unfortunately there may be another Baghdad or two along the way, anti-imperialism will win because the systemic capital/imperial construct has ceased to have material and moral and political coherence. American and Russian imperialisms are failing because they have met their matches in, ironically, the global financial and consumer goods markets, which demand geopolitical stability and free trade, as well as in the third form of warfare (nationalist resistance) and which, in these particular Iraqi and Chechen cases, is given added impetus by being allied with the fifth form (see below).<sup>13</sup>

### Wars of Nationalist Resistance and Liberation

The first and second kinds of global wars of capitalism – conquest of resources and superpower rivalries – have provoked in the conquered lands the third kind of war – wars of nationalist resistance and liberation. The idea of nationhood grew out of

that earlier violent conjuncture of Habsburg Spain, Catholicism, Protestantism, and The Netherlands. The Dutch Protestant revolt against the Habsburgs of the late 16<sup>th</sup> Century, the first recognisably modern war of national liberation, was the opening salvo in a process of national state and culture building in Europe that was cemented as a reality by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The idea of national sovereignty spread around the world and today is still a fundamental if tragic force, especially in an age of emerging globalism in other respects. The Euro-Atlantic imperialists provoked resistance everywhere they went and organised demands for liberation of 'subject' peoples, including even European settler colonial peoples, from European empires began to grow in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. The archetypical American War of Independence was inspirational in many places and still today the linguist nationalist project<sup>14</sup> of uniting each ethné or culture within a single nation-state is underlying many bloody conflicts. The Iraqi and Palestinian nationalist resistances are no exceptions. The dying of imperialism will undoubtedly still be bloody and the violent dismemberment of multi-ethnic, colonially-created states in Africa, Asia, and Oceania seems set to be a continuing tragedy.

#### Class Wars Within Capitalism

A fourth kind of global war began dialectically within capitalism as its antithesis – the class war of anti-capitalist socialism. Capitalist industrialisation from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century totally transformed the social and economic structures of the metropolitan powers and made colonial possessions even more valuable for their resources. The new industrial socio-economic structures summoned into being a vast army of industrial workers in the core areas of the world economy and a vast army of agricultural, mining, and transport workers in the colonised periphery. These working classes developed new forms of consciousness about their social contexts and, correspondingly, new socio-political demands. Working class consciousness in the core became naturally anti-capitalist or socialist and sometimes revolutionary and in the periphery anti-imperialist nationalism coloured those elements. The conjuncture of electoral democracy, social welfarism, and universal education in the core states were a consequence of these conflicts. Social democracy arose there as a consequence of prosperity and the needs of advanced capitalism for science, technology, and management skills.

The success of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions grew out of a powerful hybrid alignment of core industrial and peripheral agricultural working classes within a capitalistic world economy. Notwithstanding the collapse of Soviet Communism, class struggles and the social democratic project have not disappeared but lie some-

what dormant in the face of the collapse of state communism and the current strength of the capitalist boom. But the history of capitalism certainly teaches that its periods of economic prosperity are interspersed with periods of depression that prompt its historically-specific regimes of accumulation to be transformed in an evolutionary manner.<sup>15</sup>

### War of Islamic Resistance

Growing out of all the other wars of capitalist expansion is a fifth kind of conflict that has its roots at the very conjuncture of the beginnings of capitalist expansion in the 15<sup>th</sup> century – the War of Islamic Resistance. The power and virulence of Islamic Resistance to Western Capitalist domination comes from its complexly determined nature as being at once historically, nationalistically, and culturally antithetical to capitalism itself. Islam in its purist and most ascetic form is the last great non-capitalist material and social culture on earth. With its strong medieval roots in village agriculture, the town bazaar, petty commodity trading, and tribalist family structures, Islam remains in places and at heart a collectivist, inclusive, and totalising regime that has always had the capacity to motivate zealotry, especially against infidels. Unlike Christianity, it has not undergone the type of *volte face* of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century Protestant accommodation to and legitimation of worldly capitalism. Of course Islam is a many faceted culture with many degrees of and forms of observance and many philosophical traditions. The violent resistances we see today in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Algeria, are all variations of a moral nexus drawn by radicals between anti-imperialist nationalism, anti-Christian-Westernisation, anti-individualism, and anti-capitalism. Those radicals are having greater success in motivating resistance to Western penetration the greater is that penetration at the point of a gun in the wake of the September 11, 2001. The misnamed ›War on Terror‹ seems to be perceived widely within Islamic societies as a ›War on Islam‹ precisely because a real ›war on terror‹ would not in fact be fought by conventional armies, as Dyer has rightly pointed out.<sup>16</sup>

### War of Environmental Resistance

The sixth and final global conflict of capitalism is rooted in the tragic nature of nationalism and is also provoked by the beginning of the breakdown in the tense symbiosis between capital and the nationalistic state that emerged from the settlement of 1648. That is, as capitalism has broken the bounds of national borders and developed

a completely globalising dynamic, a tendency that it always had, the contradictory desires by states both to control capitalism in the interests of national wealth and protection of dominant class power and to project state power outwards to dominate other states, has begun to undermine the original symbiosis. Globalised capitalism no longer needs national states in the way it once did and would prefer to be rid of their controls. But states are striving to remain relevant to global firms. One way they can remain so is to self-limit the extent of domestic control while trying to prevent the emergence of global governance that would undermine their sovereignty.

Thus the tragedy of nationalism is that while it enables many people to break free from imperial domination, at the same time it prevents the emergence of a globalised consciousness and ethic that are necessary to save the biosphere from the unchecked ravages of an unregulated global capitalism. The conjuncture of myopic nationalism and global capitalism is now destroying the planet. When certain leaders say that their nation's interests coincide with those of their domestic oil, coal, and timber corporations, which override those of all other people when it comes to global warming and environmental destruction, they are asserting a fundamentally immoral position.

Against that position of narrow self interest that leads to environmental and social destruction an army of resistance is emerging that will, I predict, if continually thwarted and spurned by such political myopia, become a violent force that starts the last global war of capitalism. If this happens it will largely be a guerrilla war within the capitalist heartlands, reminiscent of the socialist class war. Indeed, it is likely that we will see a further convergence between socialism and environmentalism so that they become a single globally-oriented ideology. Many thinkers and activists, such as Peter Singer<sup>17</sup>, have been trying to affect that synthesis. But serious violence will probably not in fact occur. The development of globalist ideology, globalist alliances, global social movements, and global governance institutions out of nationally-based politics could bring about the required revolution. The dreams of internationalist movements for peace, worldwide solidarity, socio-economic reform, and global governance that seemed to be so powerful before the 1914-18 War at last could really be feasible because, paradoxically, of the globalisation of capitalism, the new technology of communication, and the environmental and social limits of capitalism's trajectory.

### Historical Inevitability or Contingency of Capitalist Domination?

This sketchy story of the economic and geopolitical history of capitalism, with its cataclysmic events, conjunctures, and deep processes since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, is one of the interconnection of economic »imperatives«, with capitalist state power and resis-

tances to it. A globalising process with many complexities, local variations, contingencies, twists, turns, and disruptions, has occurred, which we can examine looking backwards from our present vantage point of an almost completely globalised world and try to grasp as a *historical* rather than teleologically unfolding inevitability. That examination, however, does reveal a certain path dependency and directional trajectory. If human society is a chaotic system it does exhibit powerful attractors that hold the historical processes to certain paths within limits, but if it is pushed towards a different trajectory, some processes within chaotic systems are strongly directed by »runaway« mechanisms that pull them towards new equilibria quite different from prior states. Thus, using this kind of terminology, we can say, justifiably perhaps, that early European capitalism in the 16th century was in a highly contingent state and there were powerful countervailing forces that could have vanquished or contained it, and then perhaps throttled it, just as seems to have happened in Ming China and Mughal India. Once it had begun to break free from state control through the economic and imperial possibilities of the New World, the European capitalist socio-economic system was able to move to a different trajectory that took on a certain degree of directionality in very broad terms. This would indicate that the »discovery« and conquest of the Americas was a really crucial development compared with the trajectory of Chinese adventurism of the 15th century. The new worlds of trade and plunder permitted the entrepreneurial class unprecedented opportunities to build their private capitalistic activities.<sup>18</sup> Allied to this was the competition between various European powers, epitomised by the Spanish-Dutch-Portuguese rivalry in the 16th and 17th centuries for stimulation and control of private trading in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.<sup>19</sup> Whatever possibilities of autonomous capitalist development there might have been within Asia in early modern times, the penetration of European states (as opposed to small-scale merchant companies) in the 19th century seems to have had a detrimental effect.

The European ruling aristocratic classes soon recognised in many places the potential benefit to them of the emerging capitalists and alliances were formed in several places, especially in northern Europe, but the aristocratic class generally refused to cede wholesale political power. State power later passed into the hands of the capitalist classes in various ways, including through revolutionary upheavals in many places, culminating in the French Revolution. But the continuation of capitalism itself was never in doubt during the aristocratic reactions to bourgeois pressure and absolutist impositions in the 17th and 18th centuries that prompted those revolutionary upheavals.<sup>20</sup> The historic compromises that often came out of those class struggles produced an early kind of quasi-capitalist state, especially in The Netherlands and Britain, that was able to project itself outward in ever-greater pursuit of imperial possessions in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century the more completely »modernised«

(in the sense of being devoid of vestiges of the aristocratic past) revolutionary states of America and Russia were able to dominate the world through their single-minded harnessing of the state-military-industrial nexus in the interests of geopolitical hegemony. Perhaps we will see a similar phenomenon in the 21<sup>st</sup> century with China or India but that seems unlikely for the reasons mentioned previously with regard to the growing untenability of imperialism in a multi-polar world.<sup>21</sup>

From the viewpoint of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we can understand the last 500 years as exhibiting a punctuated equilibrium and also a broadly directional pattern. Warfare, economic growth, and global integration have been continuing features of this whole epoch but not following a smooth, unidirectional path. Enormous local variation and unevenness, long periods of stagnation in various places at various times and in many places today where capitalism has not revolutionised the material production regime (except negatively) nor delivered material advances. Thus the history of capitalism has had both deep currents of continuity that have marked out a definite path for five centuries, which has resulted in the current global dominance as a whole system, and powerful currents of resistances and failures, which have produced the great uncertainty and unevenness in the system today. Triumphalism is hollow in the face of the Islamic resistance, the massive and worsening inequality of wealth and poverty, the social and environmental degradation of the many extremely poor regions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and, above all, the looming global environmental catastrophe. The era of capitalist certainty and imperial triumph was very short-lived and is suddenly giving way to uncertainty and fear. The Islamic Resistance forebodes the possibility of other resilient resistances. The wholesale manipulation and domination of nature that capitalism has fed on is reaching its structural limitation and a new path will have to be found. What can this tell us about deep historical time in general and the possibilities of the future?

### The Deep and Surface Times of Society: Or What Might We learn From the Trajectories and Conjunctions of History?

The study of world history, largely as an antidote to western triumphalism and the overtheorisation of some historical sociology and historical economics, has grown in recent times. Many of the attempts to construct ›Big History‹ (in David Christian's 2004 term) have employed new master narratives<sup>22</sup> that try to avoid somehow the old general theoretical concepts such as imperialism, capitalism, world system, and modernism, that grew out of the era of classical sociology and political economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. In keeping with the consciousness of the era, a central theme in much of the new work is that of ecology; particularly the idea of energy balance in

the evolution of societies. While this is a positive development in general, the danger is that the events and conjunctures of socio-political history – the contingent ›surface‹ eruptions, catastrophes, and transitions in regimes will be overlooked in the pursuit of ›big‹ or ›deep‹ time alone.

Deep social time is the subterranean current of fundamental historical forces that runs during very long periods beneath and intertwined with the relations, events, and phenomena of the social world and structures the lives of all persons. Deep time is ›deep‹ because it is far ›beneath‹ or implicated within the visible surface of phenomena and processes and very long lived in the structural sense. Various characterisations of what can be called ›deep social time‹ have been made in Smithian, Marxian, Darwinian, Weberian, Popperian, Braudelian, and Wallersteinian terms. Each has emphasised *la longue duree* of the rhythms, cycles, continuities, and discontinuities of production, sociality, and social structural creativity and reproductivity.

The concept of deep time was coined<sup>23</sup> to describe the geological and palaeontological processes of continuous, discontinuous, and ruptured yet unified very long history of forces, eras, phases, and variations in the natural evolution of the earth. In deep time, earth history is non-linear yet long lived and unified. The dialectic of continuous structural processes and contingent disruptions has produced a complex pattern in the present, revealed starkly on the surface in certain key places by recent process such as erosion, which we can understand and use to explain this deeper flow of temporal processes, events, and ruptures that links the long history, the present, and the future.

The deep time pattern of geological history is theorised as a consequence of the shifting dynamic interactions between the forces of plate tectonics, surface crust/magma interactions, bolide impacts, ocean currents, atmospheric forces, and biospheric forces. The processes had a definite origin in the formation (out of a background of even older and more fundamental processes of the galaxy) of the solar system with definite parameters of mass, energy, and time. Once that background, those parameters, and that temporality are understood, the planetary forces of mass and energy and gravity form a foundation for all subsequent history. But they do not simply determine a linear path. The path is historical.

Similarly, the deep time of biology also contains the dialectic of structure and discontinuity in the history of speciation. Just as the great majority of past landscapes have disappeared under the grinding remorselessness of deep planetary processes and the cataclysms of violent events on the surface (such as supervolcanoes, continental rifts, and bolide impacts) so the historical record of life exhibits this deep connection between genetic and molecular continuity and a vast array of temporally specific forms, separated by structural ruptures on a fundamental level but joined by structural continuities on other levels.

The deep time pattern of biological history is theorised as the consequence of the dynamic interconnections between cosmological, geological, atmospheric, bio-genetic, and bio-phenotypical structures. Once the simplest self-replicating molecules evolved on earth, lifeforms or species evolved very slowly within this highly contingent context. Organic history is both delineated and enabled within this structure but not simply directed onto a linear path nor somehow guaranteed a necessary continuation. Several times in biological history the continuation of life on earth was in great doubt because of cataclysmic events. Recent discoveries about the history of planet Mars indicate that the environment of that planet has undergone such massive alterations over its history such that had they occurred on earth the continuation of life here would have been very problematic. On the other hand, once set in motion, as it were, life has developed a mutually interacting or feedback relationship with the inorganic environment of the planet such that the biosphere and the geosphere form parts of a larger system. Human social organisation with its material production process, born out of a combination of instinct and consciousness, has over time become an important element within that system.

The long-run history of socio-cultural formations, with their temporal specificity, is also connected at a deep level by social structural continuities that are delimited by the parameters of human social possibilities. Like the history of species, the history of societies can be conceptualised in evolutionary terms as having witnessed a long-term bushy patterning of societalisation throughout the Holocene. All human social organisation and institutionalisation has both produced and occurred in such a way as to leave this dense pattern that can be discovered and described by the historian. No conscious understanding of the pattern of social structural consequences of social interaction has been necessary for humanity to produce the history but it's only through the prism of social scientific understanding that the pattern reveals its meaning via the conscious uncoverings and imaginings of science. The real pattern thus revealed is the consequence of the enormously variable possibilities of interaction between human socio-biology, human social experience, human consciousness, and the inherited social structural contexts of all social interaction and consciousness.

Landscapes, species, societies, all have this dialectic of structural continuity and historical contingency and specificity. The conjunctures of history, where deep forces come together to produce crucial moments of change and discontinuity, exist in all these realms of the processes of the earth. Thus deep social time is not linear, not cyclical, not inevitable, not teleological. It is historical, structural, contingent, evolutionary, and undirected over the very long run. It is not predictable because not unidirectional but it is discoverable and explicable because of the structural limitations. We can build explanatory generalisations on various levels of abstraction. The

history of the social sciences is the record of the attempts to build these theories and their explanatory persuasiveness has increased throughout the past two centuries.

If deep social time is at once non-linear but continuous, non-teleological but directional in phases, how can this combination of features be theorised so as to explain the historical pattern and path? The historical sciences of the earth and of life have been able to explain the complex processes of their domains by generating theories that do posit processes without a subject and without teleology, but which are deeply caused by natural structural forces inherent within the very mode of existence of the substratum of their domains. Their explanations are of integrated systems. Seeking for and finding the hierarchical systemic modes of interconnection of the many forces within nature as well as the causes of system discontinuity or rupture have enabled the natural sciences to explain the histories of their domain systems. The same hope must animate social science quite explicitly if we are to take seriously the desire to really explain long-run social history.

#### The Contributions of Critical Realism, Structurism, and Systemic Complexity to a Historical Science of Society

Social science, then, in order to be a science akin to those of the earth and life, must search for the structuring forces that are the ›deep‹ causal contexts of social behaviour, social organization, and social evolution. The first requirement is to make the crucial ontological steps that all science has had to make – the adoption of a *systemic and historical* conception of the objects of enquiry. The positing of a *systemic* reality that needs explanation beyond the individual components that seem to constitute the system has been fundamental to all science. There is not the space for a detailed excursion into this philosophical argument but it is essential to point out that the adoption of a scientific methodology for social explanation does not mean the abandonment of humanistic understanding, as is sometimes erroneously asserted. That human behaviour and consciousness occurs systematically requires that it be studied as such rather than primarily as a problem within a discourse of morality, human empathy, and individual motivation and choice. That there are moral systems and individual choices does not make them the sole or even prime objects of enquiry. Systemic socio-biological relatedness and motivation is primary for the existence of humanity. The old science/humanities distinction is a false one that has bedevilled social, cultural, and historical enquiry and led many historians to wrongly believe that general theories have no place in historical explanation for there are no general structural continuities in history. Of course there is a basic contradiction within such a methodological presupposition since historical discourse is rife with putative and

elliptical generalisations that are poorly specified and conceptualised. Indeed, no social explanation can do without generalisations.

The domain of socio-behavioural science, one of the great domains of scientific knowledge along with those of astronomy, physics and inorganic chemistry, earth science, and biological science,<sup>24</sup> has to have one or more foundational theories if progress is to be made in research. Theorisation of the other great domains has proceeded apace over the past two centuries and each is now more or less unified by theoretical consensus about deep structuring forces even though much disputation about the details of theories persists within them. No such unity exists within the socio-behavioural domain. The construction of general theories is being attempted from several perspectives. There are several reductionist strategies that are trying to reduce social causation to individualist neurophysical and biochemical causation or to individualist rationalist causation. There are also several realist strategies that begin with irreducible social relational structures as systemically emergent and build theories of the causal power of those relational structures. There is also the related systemic socio-biological strategy of seeing society and behaviour as a complexly determined social structuring processes that combines human biological and socio-cultural forces. The leading recent theorists of this strategy are Boyd and Richerson<sup>25</sup> and Runciman<sup>26</sup>. It can be argued persuasively that Marx greatly predated them in this concern to build a synthesis of social and biological sciences and he recognised the significance of Darwin to that project, something finally coming back to the fore now that Social Darwinism has faded from intellectual circles if not from political ideology.

Critical realism is essential in two senses – firstly as the foundational idea that social reality consists of emergent real structures of social relations that have a causative power and which exist through time and space (ie that societies exist as real systemic entities), and secondly, the idea that the phenomena of the social world (ie individual and collective behaviour, including expression, social events, and the material products of social interaction, including the socially-transformed physical environment) have to be studied critically (not at face value or accepting the self-descriptions of actors) via the use of theory and research as a means to uncover the deeper causal structuring forces at work. Those forces are psychological and social relational. Put another way, psychological and social relational structures must be studied and theorised as the means to explaining the nature, variety, and history of societies in all their scales and complexities of organization.<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately, some areas of social enquiry have proceeded on the basis of a conception of social reality as being aggregates of individual behaviour and so the task is to examine only individual motivation and choice. This rational choice and individualist strategy for enquiry finds it impossible to deal with systemic social entities, such as families, institutions, classes and nations in any coherent manner.

The second step for a social science of deep time is to grasp the fundamental process within society that links human and social forces – the social structuring process. This is the process that makes social life possible and therefore human life possible. Society is real insofar as there are structures of social relations into which everyone is born and which must be reproduced through social behaviour. The set of essential interconnections between social relations, social behaviour, social consciousness, and social reproduction, and the degree of fidelity and infidelity of the social reproductive process, is the site of social transformation and, ultimately, the long-run history of each society and of societalisation as a whole.

There has been an arid debate in the social sciences about philosophical methodology, born, in part, of frustration and disagreement about specifying the fundamental nature of the object of enquiry. There seems little doubt to me that the systemic nature of society requires an approach to investigating it that places the basic processes of the system as such at the centre. This means that methodological structurism must be the appropriate framework in which to connect critical realism, social theory, historical enquiry, and evolutionary theory of the deep time of society because it situates the science at the focal point of the *social structuring process* of human agential action that is the quintessential social reality. The social structuring process is neither an aggregate of individual behaviour nor a holistic, unanalysable, entity. Unlike all other animal social systems, human social systems are an ongoing, evolving, process of social structuring that makes society itself a historical process. It seems to make no sense to either abstract rational action from the total system and study that devoid of its systemic embeddedness or to study the system or any part of it as if it were not a process of historical complexity. A complex system is one with many levels, hierarchies, and facets of integration and cleavages of disintegration. Social systemic integration is on micro, meso, and macro levels and each level plays certain roles in the structure and regulation of the system.

Human societies, then, are real, historical, complex systems of social structuring processes that change through time and do so because of the inherent processes of reproduction and evolution that occur within their normal functioning. In these essential respects – systemic integration, historicity, and evolution – society constitutes a fundamental domain of reality upon earth and must have a science that is adequate to the explanation of those realities. Above all, it is the actual evolution of societies as systems that we must explain and which, once explained, affords insight into their possible paths into the future.

## The Ubiquity but Non-Linearity of Evolution

The idea of evolution has been growing in importance within western thought and culture for centuries. That things and systems change via the emergence of novelty from prior states is now taken as axiomatic even by many religious thinkers. This idea has a close connection with the idea of progress. Together these ideas are now central planks of capitalist culture and the ideologies of its dominance. But until Darwin, no good description of nor causal basis for understanding the evolution of life had been adduced. Indeed, Darwin's revolution was in both the description of natural history and evolutionary theory. In the social domain, evolutionary concepts have been, in a sense, an ideological substitute for scientific thought about the mechanisms of evolution. No serious alternative to Neo-Darwinism as a general theory of social evolution has been proposed. Concepts of progressive developmental stages from supposed lower to higher forms of society have been used widely as an alternative to a genuine evolutionary theory. Such thinking is prevalent in the long-run economic development literature, which cuts across the problematic of the history of capitalism in an unhelpful way. That is, the ubiquity of economic development (measured in material terms and abstracted from socio-institutional change) over the past half millennium as a ›progressive‹ unilinear path is sometimes assumed from the beginning in this discourse. The connection between that ›progressive‹ path, the violent geopolitics of the whole era, and the failure of the ›progressive‹ development to benefit (even materially) all or most of the earth's people is little discussed within this narrow kind of literature. Insofar as that failure is discussed it is sometimes merely to assume that it's only a matter of time before the benefits are spread to everybody, as soon as those ›undeveloped‹ areas can accept and adopt the necessary socio-institutional and cultural arrangements that the West is offering so enticingly.

A progressivist, often teleological, stages theory is no substitute for a scientific approach to the problem of social evolution. A scientific approach is one that eschews teleological assumptions of all kinds and focuses on the systemic, nonlinear and historical nature of the object of enquiry. The Darwinian tradition of theorisation of the evolution of life has within it two distinct but closely related objects of empirical enquiry – the evolution of each species and the evolution of all life such that over deep time there has been a vast number of species. How and why species emerge, how each evolves over time, and why they become extinct are the basic issues. Any ideas of progressive direction or unfolding of essences are absent from Neo-Darwinian theory.<sup>28</sup> Deriving from this is the second order issue of why there has been a radiation of species. That is, from a presumed beginning as a single species or at most a small number of different but similar species, life has evolved to produce a vast array of billions of species, more than 90% of which have died out completely but of which

many millions still exists. This can be accounted for within the theory by the idea of niche specialisation, environmental history, and the potential for adaptability, and so does not require the postulation of progress.

Analogous to this, we can say that the history of societies shows something of a similar, if much less vast, process of societalisation in the sense of a radiation of different societies, as well as a pattern of evolution within each society. Of course societalisation has followed a somewhat different course from speciation and the time frame is vastly different. One crucial basic difference is the possibility of a combination or fusion of societies, something that is not possible for species. Societies are consciously social as well as biological systems and that sets them apart from purely biological systems. The boundaries between societies and species are quite different in their significance.

Thus social evolutionary theory has two problems – the macro problem of societalisation in the very long run and the more specific problem of evolution of particular societies. The two problems are more closely intertwined for social evolutionary explanation than for biological because the merger of societies is a common phenomenon. Species, by definition, cannot merge to form a single species. Social boundaries are marked largely by blood relatedness, language, and culture, but also by geography, economic exchange and, in more recent times of human history, by institutions and especially by explicitly organized boundary protection via the use of force. Territorial instinct for human groups, an instinct common to all terrestrial mammals, is a strong determinant of social boundaries. The Pleistocene-Holocene process of societalisation is a process resulting from several related processes – colonisation of vacant land, social splitting, geographical separation, fusion of separate cultures, and internal evolution of language, culture, and institutions of separated but once unified societies. Divergence and convergence over time produces a theoretical cladogram that has both features so that it forms a lattice-like pattern rather than the bushy pattern that we see with the evolution of species within particular classes and genera.

Evolution within a particular society produces a pattern of punctuated equilibrium over the long term. All societies throughout their history seem to exhibit this pattern of periods of relative stability interspersed with periods of rapid change. At times change can be so catastrophic that societies cease effectively to exist. Indeed, punctuated equilibrium seems to be a universal pattern in all long-run evolutionary processes<sup>29</sup> that are caused by the internal dynamic between generative and structural levels of integration. The normal state is one of stability and faithful reproduction. When, for whatever contingent reason, large-scale or catastrophic change occurs within the environment or within the system itself, the system either successfully adapts by finding a new equilibrium state or trajectory, or collapses and dies. This is essentially a chaotic pattern through time in that systems have multiple possible

stable states around different points (or attractors) of integration and will remain at a particular point until radically disturbed or destroyed.

The generation of innovations within the dynamic between social reproduction and social structuring is responsible for such a pattern in social history. Social reproduction is the normal imperative of social behaviour but innovations also arise at the micro (or generative) level of agential behaviour (the only place where innovations can arise because only humans and not institutions are social agents). Innovations are a normal part of social behaviour. How and why innovations become selected, how and why they spread, and how and why they have certain consequences at the macrostructural or organisational level of the system are all empirical questions. The basic argument, then, is that humans behave in such a way as to be both the agents of social reproduction and the producers of social innovations. These behaviours are at once individually specific and collectively patterned. Innovations at the generative level have systemic (or phenotypical) level consequences depending on selection and propagation conditions. Those conditions are macro-organisational in terms of being relational structures that are rule governed systemic social and cultural networks, which in turn regulate the individual and collective behaviour of all the agents within the system. Behaviour and organised systemic networks of social relations are implicated within each other such as to form a dynamic social structure. ›Surface‹ and ›deep‹ enquiry are both necessary.

Social structures exhibit a great deal of stability and must do so in order for human existence to be maintained. That is, human biological life is necessarily social life and requires social continuity at both micro and macro levels. Thus once a certain social structure comes into being it naturally has a strong path dependency in socio-institutional form because of social reproduction. The emergence of new social formations out of the large-scale historical events of European imperialism, such as the conquest of Mexico and Australia, and many similar events in the geopolitical, institutional, and economic history of capitalist expansion of the past half millennium, have set in place societies that persisted in structurally continuous forms for centuries in spite of internal evolutionary processes. There have been many great bursts of societal formation in various episodes of world history, especially at the times of imperial creation and disintegration in the past 500 years.

### Intervening in the Future

If social time is non-teleological, nonlinear, and non-progressive, what are the possibilities, ultimately, for any kind of certainty of knowledge about the future and thus for an interventionist ameliorative policy? What basis can there be for an optimistic,

progressive political and social program? Are social improvements possible? Indeed, is happiness possible in a world without the idea of progress? Of course modernism is centred on the idea of progress and it has become essential to our imagination and to our political ideology. There is no part of the world that is not in thrall to progress in one form or another, even if the idea is that capitalism will be destroyed. Progress is a highly subjective and contextual notion.

But ameliorative change and improvement is not the same as progress in a teleological sense for improvement in societal arrangements is a matter for judgement about the possibilities of the flourishing of humanness under certain specific conditions. The expression of happiness in any language is perhaps a good index of social improvement, as Layard<sup>30</sup> has recently argued, but this implies nothing about the *unfolding* of a general human or social essence or some eschatological necessity. One person's improvement is not necessarily another's and the achievement of goals, especially of a material kind, rarely satisfies for long. The long-run history of capitalism is, in one sense, the universal generalisation to all humanity of the capitalist impulse for ever greater consumption and the resulting ever greater gap between desire and satisfaction.

On the other hand, there are also historical trajectories and path dependencies to guide our imaginings of what is 'over the hill', as the Duke of Wellington put it. Politics and policy should be the realm where historical social science and imaginings come together but, unfortunately, as Wellington himself came to realise, the contingencies, conjunctures, catastrophes, and continuities of social change are not easier to control than the course of a great battle, which does unfold in a comprehensively understandable manner but only looking backwards, by the historian only and not to the participants. Knowledge of the systemic complexity, possible paths, and contingency of the past and present, and not hubris, must guide hope and reason into the future. At the moment hope should be declining, surely, for probable paths for humanity include massive dislocation of the sociosphere resulting from massive climate change as a consequence of ever greater industrialisation within the present fragile equilibrium of the geosphere. And hanging over us all like a doomsday threat are the world's nuclear arsenals. It is difficult to judge whether past policies and behaviours with regard to their use produce hope or despair, especially in the light of Robert McNamara's warnings.<sup>31</sup> Against this, hope can attach itself to the tendency towards greater knowledge and understanding of the interconnected complexity of all the systems of the planet and of the necessity, therefore, for humanity to live within those limits.

## Notes

- 1 Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is There a Difference That Matters?*, in: *New Left Review* 9 (2001), 31-42.
- 2 Cf. Christopher Lloyd, *Globalization: Beyond the Ultramodernist Narrative to a Critical Realist Perspective on Geopolitics in the Cyber Age*, in: *Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24, 2 (2000), 258-273.
- 3 Christopher Lloyd, *History and the Social Sciences*, in: Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner u. Kevin Passmore, eds., *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, London 2003.
- 4 G. J. Whitrow, *Time in History*, Oxford 1988.
- 5 See discussions in Eric L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*, Cambridge 1981; Ken Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton 2000; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 Vols, New York 1974-1989.
- 6 Eg Mughal India, perhaps the wealthiest imperial state in the world in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Cf. John Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, New York 1993.
- 7 Oscar C. Gelderblom, *From Antwerp to Amsterdam: The Contribution of Merchants from the Southern Netherlands to the Commercial Expansion of Amsterdam (c. 1540-1609)*, in: *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* XXVI, 3: (2003), 247-282.
- 8 Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: the Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*, New York 1986; John C. Weaver, *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900*, Montreal u. Kingston 2003.
- 9 Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, London 2002; Gwynne Dyer, *War: The Lethal Custom*, Revised Edition, Melbourne 2004.
- 10 Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Us and Others: The Familial Roots of Ethnonationalism*, in: Idem, ed., *Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare*, New York 1998; Richard Wrangham u. Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*, London 1997.
- 11 Nowhere was this more evident than in the Mughal Empire of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Century, cf. Richards, *Mughal*, as note 6.
- 12 Colin Mooers, *The Making of Bourgeois Europe*, London 1991.
- 13 Notwithstanding the excellent account of the emergence and power of the American imperium by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire*, in: *Socialist Register* 2004, 2-41, they too concede the power of public opinion and mobilization against imperial intervention abroad and loss of civil rights at home. Cf. recent debates over American imperialism and its decline in Michael Hardt u. Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge MA. 2000, David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, New York 2003, and Giovanni Arrighi, *Hegemony Unravelling*, in: *New Left Review* 32 (2005), 23-80.
- 14 Cf. Anderson, *Nationalism*, as note 1.
- 15 Christopher Lloyd, *Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political Economy of Regulation*, in: *Australian Economic History Review* 42, 3 (2002), 238-266.
- 16 Gwynne Dyer, *War: The Lethal Custom*, Revised Edition, Melbourne 2004.
- 17 Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, New Haven 2002.
- 18 Cf. Gelderblom, *Antwerp*, as note 7.
- 19 Cf. Jones, *Miracle*, as note 5; Pomeranz, *Divergence*, as note 5.
- 20 Mooers, *Making*, as note 12.
- 21 Coral Bell, *Living with Giants: Finding Australia's Place in a More Complex World*, Canberra 2005.
- 22 Examples include David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*, University of California Press, Berkeley 2004; John Robert McNeill u. William Hardy McNeill, *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*, New York 2003; Pomeranz, *Divergence*, as note 5; Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, New York 1997.
- 23 Cf. John McPhee, *Basin and Range* (1981), reprinted within John McPhee, *Annals of the Former World*, New York 1998; Marion Blute, *History versus Science: The Evolutionary Solution*, in: *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 22, 3 (1997), 345-364; Henry Gee, *Deep Time: Cladistics, The Revolution in Evolution*, London 2000.

- 24 Cf. on domains: Dudley Shapere, *Scientific Theories and Their Domains*, in Frederick Suppe, Hg., *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, Urbana 1977; Christopher Lloyd, *Explanation in Social History*, Oxford 1986.
- 25 Robert Boyd u. Peter J. Richerson, *The Origin and Evolution of Cultures*, New York 2005; Peter J. Richerson u. Robert Boyd, *Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*, Chicago 2005.
- 26 W.G. Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory*, Three Volumes, Cambridge 1983-1997; cf. also the essays reprinted in Philip Pomper u. David Gary Shaw, *The Return of Science: Evolution, History, and Theory*, Lanham 2002.
- 27 On critical realism see Christopher Lloyd, *The Structures of History*, Oxford 1993.
- 28 Cf. Stephen Jay Gould, *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin*, New York 1997.
- 29 Albert Somit u. Steven A. Peterson, Hg., *The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Debate in the Natural and Social Sciences*, Ithaca 1989.
- 30 Richard Layard, *Happiness: Lessons From a New Science*, London 2005.
- 31 Robert S. McNamara, *Apocalypse Soon*, in: *Foreign Policy*, May-June 2005, 29-35.