In Defence of Rumour and Rumour-Mongering

Conventional wisdom, along with most academic literature, treats rumour as a bad thing. Some object to rumour on epistemic grounds; some object to it on ethical grounds. In this paper I focus on the epistemic objections to rumour, since the ethical objections tend to be dependent on them. I find that the standard epistemic arguments against rumour are very weak (to put it mildly). I conclude that rumours are an important and irreplaceable source of rational belief and knowledge. I also argue that recent campaigns against believing rumours or spreading rumours (i.e. being a rumour-monger) are an objectionable form of anti-democratic propaganda.

David Coady’s teaching and research cover a wide variety of philosophical topics. Most of his current work is on applied philosophy, especially applied epistemology. He has published on rumour, conspiracy theory, fake news, the blogosphere, expertise, and democratic theory. He has also published on the metaphysics of causation, the philosophy of law, climate change, cricket ethics, police ethics, and the ethics of horror films. He is the author of *What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues* (2012), the co-author of *The Climate Change Debate: an Epistemic and Ethical Enquiry* (2013), the editor of *Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate* (2006), and the co-editor of *A Companion to Applied Philosophy* (2016) and *The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology* (2018).