Can the International Community End a Dictatorship Nonviolently?Marty Branagan Centre for Peace Studies |
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| In this paper I argue that it is possible for the international community to end a dictatorship or totalitarian regime nonviolently, given the many but largely unrecognised historical successes of Nonviolence. Such a solution would be more fundamental and long-term than a violent one. However, better research, funding, preparation, and international coordination of Nonviolence are needed to make it more effective. | ||
Study in Adult Education last updated 9/4/03 |
In addressing this question, one first needs to determine whether any such intervention against a sovereign nation is justifiable, from a global perspective. A major tenet of Nonviolence is advocacy and adherence to holism, wherein any situation is judged on a global basis and as objectively as possible. Thus United States' calls for intervention in 2003 against Saddam Hussein in Iraq should be balanced with calls from numerous countries to address the many human rights abuses and crimes against humanity committed by the United States government, such as using weapons of mass destruction on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, its "carpet bombing" of Cambodia, its support for dictatorships and death squads in Guatamala and El Salvador, and its support of terrorists in Nicaragua, to name but a few. If intervention is justified, a holistic approach would address at the same time the need for structural change in global socio-economic and geo-political systems, such that dictatorial regimes are not assisted into power by forces like oil multinationals and first world governments, and then armed by the military-industrial complex.
Secondly, any international intervention in a country should ideally occur primarily through empowering and assisting the local opposition and resistance groups. This would ensure local "ownership" of the overthrow, and minimise disenchantment with foreign interference. Similarly, any regime replacing the dictatorial one should be primarily, even exclusively, instituted by the local populace, based on a culturally-appropriate model of their own choosing, and consisting of their own people. It should not, for example, be imposed from outside based on some inappropriate Western democratic model, with a covert neo-imperialist agenda.
The starting point of an international nonviolent campaign against a dictator should be education and training in nonviolent theory and tactics. This could include discussions of historical examples of nonviolent successes, the "consent" theory of power, the importance of empowered grassroots activists, the use, where possible, of openness rather than secrecy, and spreading the movement via "conversion" of opponents through treating them with respect and dialoguing with them. Formation of affinity groups should be encouraged, as well as practice in consensus decision-making and remaining nonviolent even under extreme provocation. Such education, although difficult in a police state, is still possible. It could be assisted by the outside world through smuggling into the country information and experts on Nonviolence.
Boycotts, go-slows and non-cooperation are tactics that are difficult to police, and thus ideal in the early stages of such a campaign. They have been used in many countries to great effect, such as in South Africa during Apartheid (see Ackermann & Duvall 2000). Boycotts put financial pressures on businesses collaborating with the regime; go-slows and noncooperation have a similar effect on businesses and government departments through slowing production and frustrating administration. Businesses involved in resistance can be favoured and promoted through "girlcotts", thus rewarding bravery.
Another tactic is public meetings, rallies and marches. Although more visible, they are less likely to suffer from state violence if they are openly nonviolent, and remain so at all times. Where openly nonviolent protestors are attacked, often the outrage this causes draws many more people to the cause. This was the case in Iran in 1978, where police fired on and killed unarmed protestors, mainly veiled women and teenagers. The violence of the state was thus exposed, its legitimacy was eroded and the movement grew despite the fear of further violence. As the movement grew, so did the marches become bolder and more overt. Finally the US-backed police state of the shah was overthrown, almost entirely through Nonviolence, although the regime then installed was far from nonviolent (see Powers & Vogele 1997). Similarly, beatings of nonviolent demonstrators in 1989 in Czechoslovakia 'galvanised political opposition to the hard-line communist regime'they were the "spark that started the whole movement"' (Summy 1995:170).
In the final stages of a nonviolent revolution, blockades and occupations are effective. These involve people using their bodies (and often chains and padlocks as well) to block the activities of the regime, and to occupy its workplaces. This occurred en masse in Kosovo, with protestors surrounding the parliament of Slobadan Milosovic. The final act in the revolution was when the army refused to move against the protestors; instead they sat down and removed their helmets. A similar action occurred in 1991 in Russia, when unarmed activists successfully blockaded the tanks of the attempted military coup by hardline communists.
Nonviolent resistance is always difficult within a police state, although the historical record shows it is usually possible. It can even be argued that the worse a regime is, the more effective is Nonviolence, as in a process known as moral jiu jitsu it exposes the violence and illegitimacy of the state, often hidden behind a mask of civility. The nonviolence of the liberators of India was able to 'show the world at large the fangs and claws of the [British] Government in all its ugliness and ferocity' (Kumarappa in Powers & Vogele 1997:152). The success of that campaign is often trivialised because it was against a supposedly civilised opponent (eg Kim Beazley in Summy 1995:161); in fact, it was a brutal one, which had earlier killed 11, 503 Kenyans at Mau Mau in a 'campaign notable for its atrocities in the field and its systematic torture in "concentration camps"'(Burrowes 1996: 239).
The international community can assist internal nonviolent uprisings in a number of ways, with the area of communication being important. It can provide expertise and equipment (like radios, phones and computers) so that resistance groups can talk with or email each other, and get information out to the world. Audio-visual equipment can enable them to record speeches, and film atrocities and protest actions, and broadcast them around the country and to the outside world (eg through pirate radio and television stations). The international community can broadcast into the country via television, radio and leaflet drops, giving information about the regime's activities, and how to resist them nonviolently.
Having a constant flow of information from activists inside the regime can be valuable in increasing international pressure on the regime. No country today is wholly self-sufficient or independent, and constant political and diplomatic pressure on the regime can be effective. International pressure was instrumental, for example, in ending the Apartheid regime. Strengthening bodies like the United Nations and the International Court of Justice would assist this.
Sanctions are a financial tool of international pressure, and they too can be effective. However, they often impact severely on the poor, while leaving the richest parts of the community less affected. Thus if sanctions are used they should be accompanied by food drops and similar provision of necessities. They also need to be targeted appropriately, and based on detailed economic information. During World War Two, while allied forces were giving their lives to oppose Nazism, early multinationals, many US-based, were benefiting from concentration camp labour and the holocaust, including Ford, General Motors, Chase Manhattan Bank, AGFA, IBM, Esso and Exxon. A nonviolent campaign would have identified and placed a global boycott on these companies, pressuring them to quit, and weakening the financial basis of the regime. A modern campaign could also disable the computer and communications technology of companies collaborating with the regime.
A less tried tactic is that of nonviolent invasion. This involves a large contingent of activists, trained (and preferably experienced) in Nonviolence, going into the country to help bring down the regime. Many would be proficient in the language and versed in its traditions, religion and culture. This tactic occurred in 1955, when Indian activists marched into Goa, which was then occupied by Portugal. It has also occurred when activists "invaded" military territory in England, US rocket sites, and French atomic test sites in northern Africa and Muroroa (Sharp 1973). It is similar to the many blockades that have occurred around the world, such as when Australian activists converged on the Franklin River in 1982 to save it from damming, or on remote uranium mines at Roxby Downs in 1983 and 1984 and at Jabiluka in 1998.
A common and reasonable assumption is that unarmed invaders would simply be gunned down by a dictatorial regime. History, however, shows that even the worst regimes are reluctant to brutalise organised nonviolent activists. For example, in 1943 a group of German women whose Jewish husbands had been arrested demonstrated outside the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin, shouting for their husbands to be returned, despite the threat of being machine-gunned. Amazingly, they succeeded, and thousands were released (Summy 1995:176). The Nazis were one of the most brutal regimes of all time, yet a major finding of Liddell Hart, who interrogated German generals after the war, was of the Nazis' inability to deal effectively with nonviolent resistance in Denmark, Norway and Holland ' and to a lesser extent in France and Belgium: 'they were experts in violence and had been trained to deal with opponents who used that method. But other forms of resistance baffled them ' all the more in proportion as the methods were subtle and concealed. It was a relief to them when resistance became violent and when nonviolent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic repressive action against both at the same time (Summy 1995:172).
As noted above, any violence against nonviolent activists tends to strengthen rather than weaken a movement. The extreme repression suffered by Indian activists under the British regime was recorded and broadcast by foreign media. This had the effect of turning the tide of international opinion against the British. Thus, widespread, free and objective media can be an important tool in a nonviolent campaign. Modern technology could equip nonviolent "invaders" with sophisticated recording and broadcasting devices so that the action was broadcast live to the country and the world. A nonviolent invasion would overall require far less expensive equipment than an armed invasion; thus for the same cost, far more nonviolent activists could march into a country than could soldiers. Instead of one hundred thousand soldiers, there could be an action involving millions. The sheer numbers alone would be a logistical nightmare for a police state to repel. The difficulties of organising such an action could be overcome if the vast resources of the military-industrial complex were adapted to such a course, and if the expertise of activists who have already organised huge blockades and rallies were to be engaged. Such "peace armies" have been mooted by groups like Peace Brigades International; they are clearly possible, but need to be researched, trialled and funded on a large-scale.
The advantage of using Nonviolence is at least two-fold. Firstly, it avoids the long-term repercussions of violence. On a personal level, everyone killed or injured in a conflict is part of a social group, which will likely harbour resentment against the perpetrators of the death or injury. This resentment tends to last for years, and sometimes for generations or even centuries. Some people in Bougainville, for example, still despise the Japanese, sixty years after World War Two (Fisher, pers. comm. 3/04/2003), while my grandmother was hostile to Catholics because Irish nationalists had burned down her ancestors' house, almost a century earlier. This cycle of resentment can continue indefinitely, and often grows, leading to further conflicts. At an environmental level, violence also creates more problems, such as the depleted uranium shells left in the Middle East after the 1991 Gulf War. These will be dangerously radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years. Nonviolence, despite perhaps taking longer to find solutions, creates more fundamental and lasting solutions.
Secondly, any armed solution also helps finance the military-industrial complex. This is one of the world's single biggest polluters. It has few scruples about who it sells weapons to, providing for example weapons to Saddam Hussein after he had committed acts of genocide against the Kurds (Fisher 8/04/2003 pers. comm.). It is highly voracious of resources, and provides comparatively few jobs for its massive input of public money. That money could be more ethically and sustainably be spent elsewhere.
As noted above, Nonviolence has achieved many successes in a wide variety of situations and against different types of regimes, many of which were extremely brutal and repressive. For example, in South America between 1931 and 1961 nine dictatorships were overthrown by civic strikes. However, little recognition has been given to these and other successes. For example, El Salvador now has "a national day"to commemorate the heroic patriots who failed in an armed insurrection, while the success of the nonviolent civic strike is left to the reflections of a handful of scholars' (Summy 1995:171). Similar revisionism occurred with the overthrow of Milosevic; it was not, as claimed by Australian journalist Greg Sheridan, the 72 day bombing of Kosovo that ended the Milosevic regime. This bombing in fact united Serbians against NATO and bolstered Milosevic's support. What actually ended his regime was a twenty-four hour nonviolent revolution (Summy 2000:4-5).
The historical success of Nonviolence is all the more remarkable considering that it has generally been ad hoc and under-resourced, and on a national rather than international level. If but a fraction of monies given to the military-industrial complex were to be diverted to research into and practice of Nonviolence, it could provide an even more viable alternative to violent solutions than it already does. Internationally coordinated, well resourced campaigns could deal with dictatorial regimes in such a way that the solutions are fundamental and long-term, rather than causing as many problems as they fix, as is often the case with violent solutions. Marty Branagan Centre for Peace Studies University of New England Australia
References: Ackerman, Peter and Duvall, Jack 2000 A Force More Powerful: a century of nonviolent
conflict Palgrave, New York and Hampshire
Burrowes, Robert J. 1996 The Strategy of Nonviolent Defence: A Gandhian Approach State University of New York Press Albany
Fisher, Scott 2003 Personal Communication 3/04/2003
Fisher, Scott 2003 Personal Communication 8/04/2003
Powers, Roger S. & Vogele, William B. 1997 Protest, Power and Change: an
encyclopaedia of nonviolent action from ACT-UP to Womens Suffrage Garland Publishing, Inc. New York & London
Sharp, Gene 1973 The Politics of Nonviolent Action Porter Sargent, Boston Ma.
Summy, Ralph in Salla, Michael, Tonetto, Walter & Martinez, Enrique (eds) 1995, Essays
on Peace: Paradigms for Global Order, Central Queensland University Press, Rockhampton
Summy, Ralph 2000 'That nasty "N" word' in Social Alternatives Vol.19 No.4 December 2000 pp 4-5
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