Do We Risk Obscuring the Good Through Teaching Effective and Efficient 21st Century Planning Process?
Michael Gunder
Head of Department
Department of Planning
[Planners] are practical ethicists; their work demands
that they make ethical judgements – again and again as they work. Ethical
judgements, however embarrassingly little they may be discussed in planning
schools, are nevertheless inescapable and ever present in practice. (Forester
in Tewdwr-Jones 1995: 171)
This paper returns to the issues raised by the Gunder and Fookes (1997) paper first delivered at the 1996 ANZAPS Conference in Adelaide. That paper critiqued an earlier paper by the late Brian McLoughlin (1994) which stated that planning education failed as it did not provide students with a critical understanding of how cities and societies actually functioned. Gunder and Fookes argued from an empirical position in contrast to McLouglin that there was significant critical content in the core component of planning education, at least in Australasia.
This paper seeks to re-examine this argument in greater agreement with McLoughlin. It questions whether this identified critical component is often diffused by maintaining a focus on teaching how to analyse and critique planning for good instrumental planning process rather than teaching an understanding of when planning outcomes produce an ethically good and creative result. It wishes to move the debate on critical content beyond that of Cuthbert (1997) and Gunder (1998a) towards that of Sandercock’s (1997, 1999) planning education as ethical enquiry, with the addition of the word ‘creative.’ A creative ethical enquiry which addresses how cities and societies actually work. An enquiry where we as planning educators and researchers ‘rethink and recast the projects of … planning in terms of not only rationality but of rationality and power, Realrationalität’ and Realpolitic (Flyvbjerg 1998a: 236).
The paper will begin with a consideration of current resource management in New Zealand and how this sub-set of planning manages to displace from the discipline what many would consider the most positive value of the activity – creating change in an ethical manner towards the societal and environmental good. It will then examine how plans can be and are being evaluated. It will suggest that evaluating plans for their effectiveness and efficiency of process does not, in itself, result in an evaluation of whether a plan is ‘good’ or not. The paper will then consider the implication of this scientific managerial approach to planning on planning education. It will argue that we as educators have a critical responsibility to not allow this purely instrumental rational approach to be used as a justification to displace and obscure ethical and creative development of our planning students. This is particularly so as planning departments become increasingly under pressure to teach more managerial scientific skills at the expense of alternate perspectives of how the world actually works and for whose interests it appears to do so.
Excuse me if the latter sounds like Brian McLoughlin (1994), but he was largely right, if a little heavy handed in his planning school abolitionist approach and in his inability to see the pedagogical value of story telling derived from professional practice. I also warn that this paper raises more questions than it answers, but I suggest that continuously asking questions must be what creative ethical enquiry is all about, subject to also getting the occasional answer.
This section will first draw on the now quite extensive literature on the New Zealand Resource Management Act (RMA) to define good planning process in the context of modernist efficiency and effectiveness. It will then examine if this New Zealand planning emperor of bio-physical synoptic process can be clothed by good ethical and creative outcomes for the actors and environment involved. Or phrased a different way, it will ask whether good community outcomes themselves can, at best, only be accidentally produced in light of the modernist narratives, or mythologies (Murray and Swaffield 2000), sustaining this instrumental RMA process. Can this process itself be evaluated as good even if this means that most of the effected population forgo available opportunities to participate in plan preparation in the achievement of efficiency? Further, what are the pedagogical implications on our planning students as a consequence of teaching achievement of this effective and efficient planning process in New Zealand? A planning practice that:
fall[s] not between
environmental and social science, but between environmental and
management science, concerned with implementing prescribed procedures for
regulating production relations with the environment. The social and political
dimensions, within which environmental regulation must take place, will be
left, if not unquestioned, then uncontested…. [leaving planning to manage
merely] known ‘scientific problems’ of production and the environment.
(McDermott 1998: 643-4)
In the wider philosophical sense this also raises a number of questions for the planning profession and its mission. This is because ethical concerns must be excluded from scientific problems (MacIntyre 1981, 1992) and problem solving, itself, is only a partially creative process in that it does not produce positive change (Higgins and Morgan 2000), not even positive environmental change. The RMA simply attempts to maintain – or sustain -- the environmental status quo, with any socio-economic creativity strictly removed (Gleeson 1996). Further, the RMA is ‘much more prescriptive’ in its requirements for plans than previous planning legislation in New Zealand (Miller 2000: 130):
Plans and Policy Statements must identify significant
resource management issues and from these develop an integrated package of
objectives, policies and anticipated environmental outcomes which could be
achieved through a number of means including rules in Plans and other methods.
Section 32 of the RMA (1994: 43) requires a range of methods to be considered based on their ‘efficiency and effectiveness relative to other means.’ Section 35 of the RMA (1994: 47) requires these outcomes and procedural processes of the plan to be monitored so as to allow the ‘authority to effectively carry out its functions under the Act.’ [my underlining]. The RMA is concerned about the efficient and effective problem solving of issues. Yet as Higgins and Morgan (2000: 118-119) note: ‘problem solving can actually inhibit creativity because eliminating the problem reduces the impetus to change to something more positive.’
Is then the RMA ‘emperor’ particularly at risk of being naked when the monitoring of implemented plans is prominently employed to measure the successful achievement of easily quantifiable bio-physical policy and objective outcomes required to demonstrate efficient methods and effective outcomes? Further, if this focus on monitoring easily accountable outcomes is correct, does this potential trend tend to obliterate planning and civic thought from whether the objectives and policies sought in the first place are in themselves serving a more complicated ethical good? This is a ‘good’ of creating or maintaining an environment within which opportunities are maximised for human well being to occur. Are relevant, but difficult to measure RMA expectations themselves being overlooked in current plans? This includes, to reopen old debates (Upton 1994,1995; Grundy 1995), the question -- are bio-physical plan outcomes alone achieving an environment that allows sustainable access to individual, corporate and/or state enabled provision of well-being to reasonably occur for all New Zealanders in the current, as well as future generations?
Avoidance of these concerns can be argued to reduce
the RMA process -- and the planners implementing the RMA -- to that of simply
serving the protection and enhancement of property rights for those that have
dominant voices and current claims to public and private resources. This is a
situation where dominance of voice is largely dependent on both cultural and
financial capital (Bourdieu 1998; 2000). Conversely, I would suggest that the
RMA is particularly effective in giving the appearance that it is neutral in
consideration of socio-economic matters, while preserving the life-supporting
capacities of the environment. However, in contrast to this mythology, economic
considerations are central to the RMA’s very core of evaluative rationality for
the preservation and facilitation of development opportunities for existing
resource assets (Memon and Gleeson 1995, Gunder 2000). I suggest that this is more often in the interests of their current
and potential future owners who have a greater propensity for dominance of
voice, than not. Short of a future socialist utopia, this rationality will
seldom be serving the socio-economic interests of the vast majority of New Zealanders, even if it does achieve some
environmental benefit for all. But is this Harvey’s (1996) environmental
justice? I suggest not.
This leads to the following sections which seek to clarify the question raised by McDermott (1998, 644): are planning
schools being increasing being put under pressure in New Zealand to ‘shift from
design and social concerns’ to that of
training our planning students to be good process clerks with a
‘singular focus on scientific and legal knowledge’ for the interests of the
dominant status quo? If so, is this at
the expense of not producing ethically
mature professional actors capable of effecting creative public action for the wider common good in a complex and messy dynamic world of
strategic games and oppression well illustrated by Flyvbjerg (1998a)? Central
to this question: what is the product of good planning? I suggest that it must
be more than maintaining the status quo or simply producing a good
plan-drafting and implementation process.
Practising planners often differentiate between
high-quality and low-quality plans, but cannot explicitly define the
characteristics of plan quality. The planning literature is surprisingly narrow
when it comes to differentiating between high-quality and low-quality plans.
The planning profession has generally avoided this issue and focused on the
technical methods used for plan preparation and the political processes of
plan-making. (Berke et al 1997: 452)
Berke et al’s (1997; 1999) research evaluated the characteristics contributing to good plans in New Zealand. They acknowledged two types of diverse evaluative methodologies. These were first, postmodernist and related critique with a focus on language, power and dominant stakeholders, and second, social science empirical analysis using a set of quantitative evaluative characteristics for statistical modelling. While acknowledging postmodern forms of plan evaluation, the study team dismisses the need for this form of critical critique because ‘contemporary plans are increasingly being derived from decision making processes that empower diverse groups and thus better account for diverse cultural perspectives’ (Berke et al 1997, 253).
I would suggest that Berke et al largely miss the point of critical analysis with their liberal acceptance of this rather idealistic position that diverse groups all have access to equal voice in current plan preparation in New Zealand, or elsewhere. Indeed their own later findings contradict this assertion, if in a rather tired class focused manner:
Compared with wealthy districts, poor districts tend
to be less politically organised, have less access to formal authority
structures, and thus have less ability to create plans that prevent adverse
effects generated by powerful development interests in a free-market economy.
(Berke et al 1999: 659)
Indeed Berke et al’s (1997; 1999) disproved original position strongly supports McDermott’s (1998) concern that the RMA legislation encourages a shift in planning’s underlying objectives in New Zealand from those of achieving ethical social and environmental justice to those of the objectives of managerial science for effectiveness and efficiency in market activity with little regard to equity, fairness and the exercise of power – economic or other. This shift is reflective of the state giving up its pastoral role of caring for its citizens towards a common welfare good. It replaces it with a role of corporate manager ensuring economic regulation and market stabilisation for individual achievement of well being, with no regard to individual or corporate position, potential or ability (Gunder 2000).
Recent research by Lovell (2000) on the Eden Park Stadium floodlighting resource consent process in Auckland well documents how the Eden Park Trust Board were able to capture the District Plan notification process to lay favourable conditions for their development plans well before local residents were aware of their ambitions. Gunder (1998b; 2000) documents how Auckland City Council manipulated their own District Plan process for similar development advantage on the Britomart site. Hillier and Van Looij (1997: 7) illustrates in Australia how articulate ‘middle-class’ interests shapes the ‘planning process… discussion and outcomes.’ Flyvbjerg (1998a) documents this strategic manipulation by dominant stakeholders masterfully in his opus on city planning in Aalborg, Denmark. Of course, this is all postmodern critique dismissed as unnecessary by Berke et al (1997) to understand what is needed for a ‘good’ plan. A plan that is good for whom? But, of course, liberal social scientists do not ask this question as it is one of values, morals and ethics, not fact. Yet we all know from Foucault (1971; 1980) that discourses of value can only become factual knowledge through contingency, luck and the strategic application of power over time -- but that is forbidden postmodern thinking!
For over thirty years Faludi (1998; Mastop and Faludi 1997) has expressed strong interest in evaluating plan quality from the perspective of modernist rationality, with a particular focus on strategic plans. His 1998 paper addresses three ways to look at planning theory that is equally applicable to his evaluation of plan quality. These are:
· Procedural – what is the object to be achieved by creating a plan;
· Methodological – how does the process work and how are decisions made; and
· Sociological – what are the conditions and embedded assumptions that allow a plan to occur or new ones to evolve.
Faludi (1998) acknowledges that while much of his earlier planning theory research was concerned with process and methodology, more recently he has concluded that it is the sociology of plans and planning that is most crucial to understanding the underlining planning theory behind what makes a good plan. Undoubtedly this level of planning resides in an analysis of the rhetoric, normative values and exercise of influence/power deployed by actors in planning decision making (Throgmorton 1996). Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls this form of analysis narratology. For Tewdwr-Jones (1995: 171) in the arenas and forums of the profession ‘value judgements form the discretionary basis to planning.’ These are issues of the particular, not universals, thus hermeneutic and related sociological and philosophical methodologies are fundamental to theoretical understanding of the good and even the effective in planning processes and the plans these processes produce (Naess and Saglie 1999; Flyvbjerg, forthcoming).
Clearly, an understanding of how values influence decision making on the part of the practitioner and how these values are embedded in plan processes are essential to evaluating if a plan is good or bad. Flyvbjerg (1998b: 210) suggests that ‘[e]mpowering civil society is a central concern for the project of democracy,’ and by implication the drafting of good community plans for the conduct of human actions. These concerns require planners wishing to construct creative and ethical plans to have an understanding of how power privileges and restricts voices within civil society and how values and facts are constructed and/or rationalised in related planning discourses. Even the RMA’s First Schedule Clause 3 (1) allows planners drafting plans to consult with whom they wish. Who they actually consult with and why they do so may be crucial to producing equitable and good plans. But, as alluded to above, full consultation with a civil society of active, aware and empowered community residents may be contrary to efficiency in plan production. However, I suggest, if planners drafting plans are driven to do so as an aspect of creative ethical enquiry, this need not be the case as a consequence of the more robust plans produced, even if RMA planning still precluded significant social and environmental change for the good.
Any academic discipline which wants a place at the
trough, but is unable to offer predictions and the technology provided by the
natural sciences, must either pretend to initiate science or find some way of
obtaining ‘cognitive status’ without the necessity of discovering facts… They
either describe themselves as concerned with ‘values’ as opposed to facts, or
as developing and incubating habits of ‘critical reflection.’ (Rorty 1987:
38-39)
Rorty’s assertion is still true, at least in New Zealand. Further, the encouragement of creative ethical enquiry is at best on the periphery of this quote and more general perceptions of what comprises traditional university education. A recent review of the Department of Planning at the University of Auckland by five academics – two non-planners (a biologist and analytic philosopher), one New Zealand (who unfortunately had to withdraw at an early stage of the review), one Australian and one British planning academic – recommended that we spend even more than the current five courses (nearly 20 percent of the current undergraduate programme) on developing further our students quantitative managerial science skills in areas such as cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. No mention was made, for or against, the considerable number of courses concerned with ethical development of our students, nor was the concept of developing creativity on the part of students, particularly in experiential studio type learning, even mentioned. For these academics it appeared ethics and creativity played no role in their epistemologically orientated worldview on their perceptions of what a university education in planning should include. Yet as Sandercock (1997: 95) notes:
There is an information explosion around us, a
phenomenal increase in data, words, paper. This explosion should not be
mistaken for an increase in knowledge and wisdom. Some knowledge is increasing,
at least quantitatively; but other kinds of knowledge are being lost…Ultimately
it may be the knowledge of the good that is most threatened by all other
advances. (Sandercock 1997: 95)
As Rorty initially wrote at the start of the post-modern deconstructive period on the fallacies embedded in modern rationality:
We are the heirs of three hundred years of rhetoric
about the importance of distinguishing sharply between science and religion,
science and politics, science and art, science and philosophy, and so on. The
rhetoric has formed the culture of Europe. It makes us what we are today . . .
Galilleo, so to speak, won the argument, and we all stand on the common ground
of the ‘grid’ of relevance and irrelevance of that victory. (Rorty 1979: 330)
Much of planning education, like many other university disciplines still
dominantly stuck in modernist rationalities, still proceeds ‘from the tacit
premise that education is a matter of transmitting neatly packaged bodies of
knowledge’ (Baum 1997: 23). The RMA and the embedded instrumental values of
managerial science tend to reinforce this simplifying, but obscuring, mind-set.
Yet Higgins and Morgan (2000: 118) argue that developing creativity in planning
students is crucial to developing good planning practitioners. They define
creativity as ‘the ability to repackage
or combine knowledge in a new way which is of some practical use or adds value’
[their italics]. This recombinant creativity and ethical enquiry about values
in particular, rather than universal, concrete situations can be quite at odds with the neatly defined packets of knowledge and epistemological concerns
of universal and eternal truth and fact core to the philosophy of science. The
latter is a dominant ethos evolved
from Descartes and Galileo’s
proto-science which is still prevalent in the research university’s continuing Cartesian anxiety towards the
loss of rational prediction and truth, at least in regard to human action
(Berstein 1983; Flyvbjerg, forthcoming )! Do not tell anyone that Sir Isaac
Newton was primarily an alchemist at odds with the Cartesian position (Dobbs
1991; Shapin 1998)! Bourdieu (2000)
calls this scientific avoidance of realrationalität in the everyday world -- the scholastic
fallacy. As he notes:
Having
observed the ignored or repressed difference between the common world and the
scientific worlds, one can endeavour, without ‘primitivist’ nostalgia or
‘populist’ exaltation, to conceptualize what remains practically inaccessible
to any self-respecting scholastic thought: the logic of practice. (Bourdieu
2000: 50)
As Forester (1999: 177) argues; planning education, literature and research ‘that remains intellectually inarticulate about questions of value’ and the actions of daily professional practice results in ‘questions of better and worse processes and outcomes’ being ‘hardly [of much] worth’. For Forester (1999: 182):
Planners
cannot really ignore these nuanced
questions of better and worse, and until our ‘planning theory’ helps us to
understand these value questions better, it will be deeply flawed – and we will
all be the worse off.
As I have argued before (Gunder 1998a), planning education has a crucial role to promote students understanding of the importance of human values, local truths and power in the ‘everydayedness’ of professional practice while incurring multiple opportunities for students to develop their creative abilities. To do so, one component of planning education must draw on the post-structural and hermeneutic literature. This will allow students, both at university and as they become practitioners, to have the necessary tools and insights to play and explore the public stage. This is a place of rhetoric, strategic games and negotiation – all of which occurs under the deployment of power and knowledge to distort rationality into rationalisation (Flyvbjerg 1998a). As recent research is showing (ibid; Gunder 2000; Lovell 2000), a significant arena for this imposition of value is in the plan preparation and implementation process. I suggest that developing an understanding of planning as creative ethical enquiry will result in our students developing planning actions – plans – with both good processes and outputs that also, more importantly, ensure a good and just society and environment.
In New Zealand critics such as Owen McShane (1998) attack planners and in particular their implementation of the RMA. Similarly, in the U.K. context, planning is often less than favourably perceived, ‘many members of the public associate town planning mainly with development control and think of the profession as regulatory, bureaucratic and reactive’ (Higgins and Morgan 2000: 119). I suggest that the underlying grounds for these concerns are partially ideologically and legislatively created, but are also reflections of poor planning outcomes where they really count. This is a failure in ethically good and creative outcomes for change towards a better environment – bio-physical and social. Both ethical and creative positive outcomes, at least in New Zealand, I would suggest, are more often lacking in plans than occurring – even if these plans are procedurally good. This is due to more than simply the, so called, exclusion of socio-economic considerations in the RMA predicated plans. This is because the plans are used to re-inforce – or sustain -- the status quo without reflective thought on the part of the plan creators.
To overcome this lack of confidence in planners, planning education has an obligation, I suggest, to produce practitioners concerned about ethics, creativity and even morality. This is what we try and achieve at the University of Auckland. Yet, at least in New Zealand, we may have an emerging problem in this regard. A letter to the editor in the September 2000 edition of the New Zealand Planning Institute [NZPI] Planning Quarterly from one of our recent Masters of Planning (Honours) graduates expresses concern. He has one of the few New Zealand community planning positions. This is a planning job that is concerned about addressing issues of socio-economic need required to achieve a good liveable community, not a planning job relating primarily to the RMA. In his letter he states a perceived potential risk of exclusion from successfully passing the membership panel for full membership in NZPI. This is because he is gaining little experience in RMA oriented planning. Yet he is constantly reflecting philosophically on his practice and feels he has a good insight into what good planning is all about (and I agree that he does) – one of the most important criteria for membership. His concerns are reinforced by a recent article on gaining membership in the same journal written by the NZPI’s previous Vice-President (Reaburn 2000). This article axiomatically focuses on the RMA for a discussion on new practitioners developing the necessary planning philosophy for professional membership in the Institution. Antidotally, I would suggest, other members of the Institution, and even some planning educators, have expressed a similar RMA only orientation to planning in New Zealand. I have concern that this may well be an emerging problem where planning has become totally emerged in process in New Zealand at the cost of the good and this may be the very reason for current negative public perceptions about the profession.
I would argue that we have a responsibility as planning educators to overcome this truncation and transfer of the profession to the sub-set of environmental resource management within the wider-set of managerial science. To do so we have to evaluate good plans and planning as being more than effect and efficient process. This demands evaluating and teaching planning as an ethical creative enquiry which attempts to understand how the range of human actors really behaves, and how and why they do so, in the shaping of environments, cities, regions and societies.
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